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 ABSTRACT
Comparative constitutional law scholarship has largely ignored political 
institutions. It has therefore failed to realize that radical differences in the 
configuration of political institutions should bear upon the way courts do 
their jobs. Parting from a case study of the Colombian Constitutional Court, 
this paper develops a theory of judicial role focused on political context, and 
particularly on party systems. Colombian parties are unstable and poorly tied 
to civil society, therefore Congress has difficulty initiating and monitoring 
the enforcement of policy, as well as checking presidential power. For that 
reason, the Constitutional Court has responded by taking many of these 
functions into its own hands. We argue that the Colombian Court’s actions 
are sensible given the country’s institutional context, even though virtually 
all existing theories of judicial role in comparative public law would find 
this kind of legislative-substitution inappropriate. Those theories rest upon 
assumptions about political institutions that do not hold true in many of the 
developing countries.
Key words: political parties, judicial role, comparative public law, Colombian 
Constitutional Court, legislative-substitution. 
 RESUMEN
Las metodologías en derecho constitucional comparado han ignorado amplia-
mente las instituciones políticas. Esto ha tenido como consecuencia que fallen 
al momento de identificar qué diferencias radicales en la configuración política 
tienen incidencia en la forma como las Cortes cumplen su trabajo. Partiendo de 
un análisis de caso —de la Corte Constitucional colombiana—, este artículo 
desarrolla una tesis sobre el papel de los jueces, dependiendo de su contexto 
político, en particular, de la organización de los partidos políticos. Los partidos 
políticos colombianos son muy inestables y tienen un vínculo muy pobre con la 
sociedad; en consecuencia, el Congreso difícilmente ha tenido iniciativa en la 
preparación y en la evaluación del cumplimiento de las políticas públicas y en 
el control del poder presidencial. Por ello, la Corte ha respondido asumiendo 
varias de esas funciones. Nosotros sostenemos que la acción de la Corte ha sido 
apropiada, dado el contexto institucional colombiano, aunque en el derecho 
público comparado casi la totalidad de las teorías sobre el papel de los jueces 
encontrarían inapropiada esta sustitución del legislador. Dichas teorías se basan 
en supuestos relacionados con las instituciones políticas, que no corresponden 
con la realidad de una parte importante de los países en desarrollo. 
Palabras clave: partidos políticos, papel de los jueces, derecho público com-
parado, Corte Constitucional colombiana, sustitución del legislador. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The core of this paper is a case study of the Colombian Constitutional Court. 
Colombia offers a classic example of a developing country that is democratic 
(in fact, it has been democratic for a very long time1), but that suffers from 
poorly functioning political institutions. In particular, the party system is 
quite weak – the system is fragmented, parties tend to have short life-spans 
and/or are internally fractionalized, and parties have only weak roots in 
society. As a result, the legislature has never been able to play a constructive 
policymaking role in Colombia, and presidents have unilaterally dominated 
the policymaking process. 
As we will show below, the Colombian Constitutional Court (hereinaf-
ter “ccc”) has viewed these political conditions as a warrant for becoming 
perhaps the most activist court in the world. Most importantly here, the ccc 
has acted as a replacement for the legislature on various issues and at vari-
ous times, by injecting policy into the system, by managing highly complex, 
polycentric policy issues, and by developing a thick construct of constitutional 
rights that it uses to check executive power. We argue it makes sense and has 
been productive under Colombia’s institutional conditions. The Court’s ex-
traordinary institutional popularity suggests that the Court enjoys much of 
the democratic legitimacy ordinarily associated with legislative institutions, 
and helps to explain why other actors have generally complied with its edicts. 
Further, the Court has proven able to accrete some of the information-gath-
ering and monitoring capacities that we usually associate with legislatures. 
The economic theory of the second best is critical for understanding and 
justifying the court’s actions. A well-functioning legislature is probably the 
best option for formulating policy and checking executive action, because 
of its superior information-gathering capabilities and democratic legitimacy. 
In these optimal conditions, an overly activist judiciary may be detrimen-
tal to the system’s development. But where, as in Colombia, a very weak 
party system and other problems push the transactions costs of legislative 
action to prohibitive levels, a well-functioning legislature does not exist. In 
its absence, a judiciary equipped with fairly strong information-gathering 
capabilities and a reasonable modicum of democratic legitimacy may be the 
institution best-equipped to take on certain legislative functions. A very ac-
tive judiciary, in other words, may be perverse under optimal conditions of 
legislative behavior but desirable as a second-best where, as in Colombia, the 
legislature does not function well. On the other hand, taking into account 
the passivity of the legislator, it is also necessary to defend the ccc judicial 
1 David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia, 201-48 (University of California Press, Los 
Angeles, 1993).
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activism as a way of avoiding international responsibility in the sense it will 
allow an analysis of the fulfillment of Colombian human rights obligations 
and commitments as a whole2.
This paper is organized as follows: in Part I, we argue that existing aca-
demic work is ill-equipped to build a theory of judicial role that is appropri-
ate for all kind of democracies because it does not begin with an analysis 
of their own political institutions. Part II explains the Colombian context, 
focusing on the incoherence of legislative politics in the country, while Part 
III describes and assesses both the failed and successful strategies used by 
the ccc as reactions to that context. Finally, we suggest a theory of judicial 
role that might work where, as in Colombia, legislatures function badly.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORy AND 
COMPARATIvE COURTS 
1.1. American constitutional theory rests on 
the wrong institutional foundations
A core assumption in American constitutional thought is that constitutional 
issues are only a relatively small subset of all political issues. This is under-
girded by an institutional story about judicial role – congresses are given 
ample room in which to make ordinary policy, and only exceptionally, when 
they surpass certain limits – say, by attacking the political system itself or by 
undoing certain foundational bargains – should courts step in 3. 
This assumption does not mesh well with most new constitutions, and 
particularly those in developing countries. As Kim Lane Scheppele has 
noted, citizens of these countries tend to adopt “thick” constitutions, with 
large amounts of material – socio-economic provisions, group rights, etc – 
that are normally left to ordinary legislation in the United States4. They also 
tend to regulate certain items in great detail5. Finally, they often expressly or 
implicitly construct a hierarchy of constitutional norms, with certain vague 
2 See Julián Daniel López-Murcia & Gabriela Maldonado-Colmenares, La protección de la propiedad 
de la tierra en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y su aplicación al 
caso de las comunidades campesinas en Colombia, in 14 International Law. Revista Colombiana de 
Derecho Internacional, 71-105 (2009). 
3 See, e. g., Stephen Holmes, Passions & Constraints: On the theory of Liberal Democracy 134 (The 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995); Bruce Ackerman, We the people: Foundations 6-7 
(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991); John Hart Ely, Democracy & Ditrust, 87 (Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, 1980). 
4 See Kim Lane Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary: Or, Why Courts Can be More Democratic than 
Parliaments, in Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism 25, 37-38 (Adam Czarnota et al., eds., 
Central European University Press, Budapest, 2005).
5 See id. at 38; Keith Rosenn, Brazil’s New Constitution: An Exercise in Transient Constitutionalism 
for a Transitional Society, in, 38, Am. J. Comp. L., 773 (1990). 
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formulations, particularly human dignity, acting as super-norms within the 
system6. The result of these three characteristics acting together is that it is 
almost impossible to think of an issue that does not potentially raise consti-
tutional problems.
Scholars tend to decry the thick constitutions phenomenon as bizarre or 
at least very unwise, suggesting that these countries will choke on an excess 
of constitutional law and/or do not understand what a constitution is sup-
posed to do7. But there is logic behind the thickness of many constitutions 
in the developing and post-authoritarian world. Constitutions in developing 
countries are thoroughly transformative documents by necessity; no devel-
oping country wants to stay as it is8. And there is a need to transform not 
merely society and the economy, but politics as well. The ordinary political 
order is generally viewed as seriously flawed. And here’s the rub: if ordinary 
politics cannot be trusted now, there is no reason to believe that it can help 
to achieve a better social or economic order. Thick constitutionalization is 
thus a signal that ordinary politics will not do as a solution to a country’s 
problems9. Hence the high volume of bodies (courts, ombudsmen, human 
rights commissions, etc.) given constitutional control power in many new 
constitutions10. Thick constitutions do not necessarily give constitutional 
courts a mandate to step in for weak ordinary institutions; it could be, as 
many in the United States have argued, that the elected institutions and not 
the court are the best interpreters of the constitutional text. But they offer at 
least the opportunity for vigorous judicial intervention. 
Any case for non-judicial interpretation of constitutional texts is much 
weaker where political actors are unlikely to be attuned to the constitution. 
And here as well, U.S. constitutional theory is not very useful for developing 
countries. The most important recent strain of American constitutional theory, 
popular constitutionalism, suggests that there is and always has been a vibrant 
culture of constitutional interpretation outside the courts in the United States, 
6 See, e. g., Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, The Enforcement of Social Rights by the Colombian Constitu-
cional Court: Cases an Debates, in Courts and Social Transformation in new Democracies 128-31 
(Roberto Gargarella et al., eds., Ashgate, England, 2006); Catherine Dupre, Importing the Law in 
Post – Communist Transitions: The Hungrian Constitutional Court and the Right to Human Dignity 
(Hart publishing, Oxford, 2003); Heinz Klug, Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalism and South 
Africa’s Political Reconstruction 164-65 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2000). 
7 See, e. g., Maurice Kugler & Howard Rosenthal, Checks and Balances: An Assessment of the Insti-
tutional Separation of Political Powers in Colombia, in Institutional Reforms: The Case of Colombia 
75, 75-76 (Alberto Alesina, ed., The mit Press, Cambridge, 2005).
8 See Cass Sunstein, Deesigning Democracy: What Constitutions Do, 68 (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2001). 
9 See Scheppele, supra note 4, at 37-38. 
10 See, e. g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Advisory Counterparts to Constitutional Courts, 56 Duke L.J. 
953 (2007); see also Thomas Pegram, Accountability in Hostile Times: The Case of the Peruvian Hu-
man Rights Ombudsman 1996-2001, in, 40, J. Lat. Am. Stud., 51 (2008). 
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both within elected institutions and outside them11. This tradition would be 
even more vibrant, they claim, if the Supreme Court did not attempt to mo-
nopolize constitutional interpretation via claims of judicial supremacy12. Since 
elected institutions like Congress are also attuned to constitutional values and 
have more democratic legitimacy, they should take over some of the judiciary’s 
constitutional review functions13. 
There is some empirical evidence that, in the United States, Congress does 
care about the constitution -committees fairly routinely debate constitutional 
issues, for example, and historically the legislature and the executive have 
settled many issues of constitutional law without the help of the courts14. Fur-
ther, non-elected actors, like civil society groups, the media, and the general 
public, seem to put many of their arguments in constitutional terms15. And it 
is plausible (although contestable) that these actors would take constitutional 
interpretation even more seriously if the courts did not claim to monopolize 
the task. 
American constitutional theory has longed viewed the democratic creden-
tials of the legislature as a reason to constrain judicial power16. Indeed, this 
notion underlies Bickel’s “counter-majoritarian” difficulty - judicial review can 
be “undemocratic” because it “thwarts the will of representatives of the actual 
people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevail-
ing majority, but against it”17. Another line of thought stresses the potentially 
superior institutional capacities of courts to formulate policy and to check 
executive power18. Empirical work finds that the U.S. congress has considerable 
11 See, e. g., Larry Kramer, The People Themselves (Oxford University Press, New York, 2004); Keith 
E Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, in, 
80 N.C. L. Rev. 773 (2002); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Contitution Away the Courts (Princenton 
University Press, Princenton, 1999).
12 See Mark Tushnet, Taking the Contitution Away the Courts, 57-65 (Princenton University Press, 
Princenton, 1999).
13 See id.; Larry Kramer, The People Themselves, 252-53 (Oxford University Press, New York, 2004); 
Keith E Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 
in, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 773, 848- 849 (2002). 
14 See, e. g., Keith E. Whittington et al., The Constitution and Congressional Committees: 1971-2000, in 
The Least Examined Branch 396 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana, eds., Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2006); Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1999). 
15 See, e. g., Tushnet, supra note 12, at 135-41. 
16 See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, in, 115, Yale L.J. 1346, 1406 
(2006); Tushnet, supra note 12; Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (2d ed., Yale Univer-
sity Press, New Haven, 1986); John Hart Ely, Democracy & Ditrust 87 (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, 1980); James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Judicial 
Review, in, 7, Harvard L. Rev.,129 (1993).
17 See Bickel, supra note 16, at 16-17. 
18 See Andrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 230 (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
2006); Gerald R. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope 15-21 (The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1991); Neil Devins & Alan Meese, Judicial Review and Non-Generalizable Cases, in, 32, Fla. St. L. 
Rev., 323, 327 (2005) (noting that American courts, unlike legislatures, do not usually hold hearings); 
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capacity to gather and evaluate information, mostly through the committee 
system, which allows it to formulate complex policy initiatives and to evaluate 
and control the performance of executive and other actors19. 
 Both the democratic legitimacy argument and the capacity argument are 
problematic in the developing world. Sometimes, problems with democratic 
legitimacy are caused by outright electoral fraud, which bedevils a lot of 
nominal democracies and obviously weakens the link between legislator and 
populace20. Also, many legislatures in the developing world have few resources, 
limiting their effectiveness as policymakers and as checks on the executive21. 
But the most important source of problems with poorly-functioning legis-
latures is rooted in their party systems. As Daryl Levinson and Rick Pildes 
suggest, party systems are the key to understanding legislative behavior22. 
Scholars familiar with American political behavior are accustomed to a sys-
tem with two fairly strong parties, each of which possesses a relatively clear 
ideological identity and relatively high party discipline (that is, most party 
members tend to vote together most of the time). The two parties compete 
for votes and tend to rotate in power fairly regularly. But the portrait of party 
systems in the developing world is often much bleaker; these parties are com-
monly plagued by two major classes of dysfunctions. In the first variety, seen 
for example in South Africa today and in the past in India and México, one 
dominant party controls the system, rarely if ever losing its majority status. 
Contrary to what one might expect, strong and independent constitutional 
courts do appear to be possible (although fairly rare) within these systems, as 
both the Indian and South African examples show23. A court in this kind of 
system may see itself as engaged in the representation-reinforcing described 
Alexander Bickel, The Supreme Court and The Idea of Progress 175 (Yale University Press, New 
Haven, 1978) (arguing that courts are often poor policymakers because of their procedural rules); 
Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, in, 92, Harv. L. Rev., 353, 394-95 (1978) (arguing 
that courts are poorly suited to deal with complex, polycentric problems because of constraints on 
their institutional capacities).
19 See, e. g., Keith Krehbiel, Information and Legislative Organization (The University of Michigan 
Press, Ann Arbor, 1991); Gary W. Cox & Matthew D. Mc Cubbins, Legislative Leviathan (University 
of California Press, Los Angeles, 1993); Cubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, in, 75, Va. L. ReV. 31 (1978). 
20 See Andreas Schedler, The Menu of Manipulation, in Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13, No. 2, 36-50, 
36 (Apr. 2002). 
21 See, e. g., Scott Morgenstern, Towards a Model of Latin American Legislatures, in Legislative Politics 
in Latin America, 1-19 (Scott Morgenstern & Benito Nacif, eds., Cambridge University Press, New 
york, 2002). 
22 See Daryl Levinson & Richard Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, in 119, Harv. L. Rev., 2311 
(2006). 
23 See, e. g., Theunis Roux, Principle and Pragmatism on the Constitutional Court of South Africa, in 
7 Int’l J. Const. L.106 (2008); Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India, in, 19Pol. Stud. J., 140 
(1990); see also Jennifer A. Winder, Building the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2001). 
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by John Hart Ely in Democracy and Distrust24, but kicked up several notches 
because of the severe democratic dysfunctions brought on by a single-party 
system.
A bigger problem occurs where parties are extremely weak entities, 
rendering the legislature a largely incoherent body. The key concept is one 
that Mainwaring and Scully call “party system institutionalization,” which 
measures the depth of the roots that parties have in society25. Parties in 
non-institutionalized systems tend to have loose or non-existent ideological 
platforms; they are chiefly vehicles of convenience for individual candidates 
seeking office rather than collections of individuals with similar policy view-
points26. These parties also lack ties to civil society groups (labor unions, 
employer organizations, interest groups, etc.)27. Internally, these parties are 
usually undisciplined, and they commonly suffer defections from sitting 
politicians (called “shirt-changing”)28. The systems as a whole are volatile; 
parties can rise to prominence and then disintegrate within the span of a few 
years; older parties are constantly dying and new ones constantly springing 
up29. And finally, these party systems are often highly fragmented – there tend 
to be a lot of parties in these systems, many of them so small that they have 
been called “taxi parties” because their national party conventions could be 
held in a taxi-cab30. Where parties lack clear ideological platforms and do 
not last very long, voters will usually be unable to use party identification as 
a tool for assessing the views of prospective legislators. But party label is a 
necessary short-cut for voters; without it, they will usually be unable to make 
an informed choice31. And where the ideological meaning of a party label is 
malleable, voters will not get what they think they are getting even if they 
do try to put weight on party label32. Coalitions will be unstable, and will be 
formed because personal favors are handed out to individual legislators, and 
not because a coherent policy compromise has been reached33. Outcomes in 
24 See eLy, supra note 3, at 102. 
25 See Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, Introduction: Party Systems in Latin America, in 
Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America 1,1 (Scott Mainwaring & Timothy 
R. Scully, eds., Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1996). 
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See id. at 16; see also Catherine M. Conaghan, Loose Parties, ‘Floating’ Politicians, and Institutional 
Stress: Presidentialism in Ecuador, 1979-1988, in The Failure of Presidential Democracy 254, 273 
(Juan J. Linz & Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1994). 
29 See id. at 13-15. 
30 See Eduardo A. Gamarra & James M. Malloy, The Patrimonial Dynamics of Party Politics in Bolivia, 
in Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America 399, 412 (Scott Mainwaring & 
Timothy R. Scully, eds., Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1996). 
31 See Mainwaring & Scully, supra note 25, at 25.
32 See id. at 22-23; Susan C. Stokes, Mandates & Democracy: Neoliberalism by Surprise in Latin America 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001).
33 See Cindy Skach, Rethinking Judicial Review, in Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism 61, 
65 (Adam Czarnota et al., eds., Central European University Press, Budapest, 2005), at 65-66. 
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such a body are unlikely to represent the views of a clear majority, or indeed 
of any large, identifiable social group34.
The capacity of legislatures in non-institutionalized party systems is also 
generally low; they usually suffer from weak committee systems and an inability 
to formulate important policy initiatives. Basically, this is because leaders of 
strong parties with long-term interests have the interest and ability to build up 
legislative power35. Individual legislators in systems with non-institutionalized 
parties generally have no such interest; their main interest is in procuring par-
ticularistic benefits (money, jobs, etc.) for themselves and their allies, rather than 
in making broad policy or monitoring the executive36. Also, party platforms 
and partisan think-tanks form a major source of serious policy ideas in modern 
politics37. Thus where parties are weak and platforms vague, fewer important 
policy ideas will enter the system. High fragmentation and low party disci-
pline mean that these legislatures have difficulty passing even legislation that 
enjoys high support38. And finally, the substantial instability in coalitions and 
in electoral outcomes helps ensure the legislators will be unable to accumulate 
the expertise necessary to manage policy initiatives39. 
1.2. Comparative Constitutional Law does not 
rest on any institutional foundations 
As Mark Tushnet points out, existing studies in the comparative constitutional 
law have tended to come in two varieties, neither of which seems quite right 
as the basis for comparative constitutional theory. In the first variety, which 
Tushnet labels “expressivism,” the underlying assumption is that constitu-
34 See, e. g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary, in Rethinking the Rule of Law After 
Comunism 25, 34 (Adam Czarnota et al., eds., Central European University Press, Budapest, 
2005); Scott Mainwaring et al., The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes: An Overview, 
in The Crisis of Democratic Representation in the Andes 1, 17 tbl.1.3 (Scott Mainwaring et al., eds., 
Standford university Press, Standford, 2006). 
35 See Gary W. Cox & Matthew D. Cubbins, Legislative Leviathan, 275-278 (University of California 
Press, Los Angeles, 1993), at 275-78 (arguing that the power of American legislatures is due to party 
strength). We should modify this statement a bit – strong parties might not create well-developed 
committee systems, but this would be because, as in some parliamentary systems (like the UK), 
these party leaders choose to centralize policy expertise in the executive. See John R. Hibbing, 
Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them, in Legislatures, 25, 34-35 (Gerhard 
Loewenberg, eds., The University Of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2002). In contrast, where parties 
are non-institutionalized, pockets of policy expertise will not exist anywhere in the system. 
36 See Mainwaring & Scully, supra note 25, at 27; Gary W. Cox & Scott Morgenstern, Epilogue: Latin 
America’s Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents, in Legislative Politics in Latin America 446, 
454 (Scott Morgenstern, eds.,Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002). 
37 See, e. g., Hans Dieter- Klingemann et al., Parties, Policies, and Democracy (Westview Press, Boulder, 
1994). 
38 See Mainwaring & Scully, supra note 25, at 26.
39 See John R. Hibbing, Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them, in Legislatures, 25, 
34-35 (Gerhard Loewenberg, eds., The University Of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2002), at 30-34. 
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tional doctrine is deeply bound up in, and reflective of, the rich texture of a 
country’s underlying traditions and culture40. The problem with this kind of 
approach is that it makes any kind of structured comparison between coun-
tries quite difficult; the jurisprudence of each individual country rests on its 
own unique historical factors, rather than depending on factors that might 
vary in predictable ways across countries. Theorizing therefore becomes 
nearly impossible and even evaluating or critiquing a court’s work is quite 
hard, again because most aspects of judicial work could be justified using 
some aspect of a country’s culture or traditions.
The other approach, which Tushnet calls “functionalism,”41 sees consti-
tutional law as something that migrates easily across national boundaries. 
Functionalists start by seeking to explain how groups of countries deal with 
common problems, and tend towards finding similarity across systems. A 
recent example of a largely functionalist debate is the comparative literature 
on the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights. One of the main con-
clusions of this work is that, contrary to some earlier writings by American 
scholars, there is a plausible way to enforce socio-economic rights. That ap-
proach is one we might call the “dialogical” model. Under the “dialogical” 
model, which takes much of its inspiration from the prominent South African 
case Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom42, courts 
attempt to give content to rights, but in a way that gives due deference to 
the expertise and democratic legitimacy of the elected branches43. Roughly 
speaking, this means courts tell the other branches that a socio-economic 
right has been infringed and give them an idea of why the right has been 
infringed, but then leave the plan for how to remedy the violation up to the 
elected branches. This approach tries to make socio-economic rights effec-
tive while holding at bay concerns about judicial capacity and legitimacy44.
40 See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, in 108, Yale L.J. 1225, 
1261-85 (1999). See id. at 1287-1305. 
41 See id. at 1238-69. In some ways, the debate between functionalism and expressivism maps onto a 
fundamental debate in comparative law between those who think that law is (and should be) easily 
transplanted across systems and those who see law as instead fundamentally non-transplantable and 
rooted in fundamental aspects of a country’s history and culture. See, e. g., Alan Watson, Legal Trans-
plants: An Aproach to Comparative Law (2d ed., University of Georgia Press, Georgia, 1993); Carlos 
Rosenkrantz, Against Borrowings and Other Non-Authoritative Uses of Foreign Law, in 1, Int’l J. Const. 
L., 269 (2003); Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kotz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3d ed., Tony Weir, 
trans. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998).
42 2001(1) SA 46. 
43 See, e. g., Mark Tudhnet, Weak Courts,Strong Rightd 242-44 (Princenton University Press, Princen-
ton, 2008); Cass Sunstein, Designing Democracy What Constitution Do 227-35 (Oxford University 
Press, New York, 2001); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experi-
mentalism, in 98, Colum. L. Rev. 267 (1998). 
44 See, e. g., Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, in 108 YALE L.J. 
1225, 1261-85 (1999), at 264; Kim Lane Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary: Or, Why Courts Can 
be More Democratic than Parliaments, in Rethinking the Rule of Law After Communism 25, 37-38 
(Adam Czarnota et al., eds., Central European University Press, Budapest, 2005), at 237.
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This literature around Grootboom makes an important contribution in 
highlighting a potentially important doctrinal tool for enforcement of socio-
economic rights. But it is a tool that depends on political context, a point that 
has not been fully appreciated in existing work. The “dialogical” strategy was 
created in South Africa, a country that is ruled by a fairly coherent domi-
nant party that is quite close to the court, and which shares the overarching 
constitutional vision45. Whether such an approach to socio-economic rights 
enforcement would work in other institutional contexts is questionable. For 
example, in a country with a non-institutionalized party system, it would 
seem more-or-less impossible to adopt the South African approach to rights 
enforcement. The “dialogical” approach seems to depend, at a minimum, on 
the presence of coherent political actors who will be interested in and capable 
of developing the right that th
2. THE DySFUNCTIONS OF COLOMBIAN DEMOCRACy 
AND THE DESIgN OF THE COURT
2.1. The Political Context – Weak Parties 
and an Abdicating Legislature
The country’s two traditional parties, the Liberals and Conservatives, were 
originally separated by different stances on certain ideological issues, par-
ticularly religion, but more importantly by intense personal dislikes and 
factional conflicts. The personal hatreds between them bubbled over into 
civil war from 1899 to 1902 named “La Guerra de los Mil Días” (“The War 
of Thousand Days”) and later in the 30s and 40s. The parties only managed 
to settle this conflict by setting up a power-sharing system enshrined in the 
Constitution, the “Frente Nacional” (the “National Front”). 
During the “Frente Nacional”, which lasted in some form from the 1950s 
until the 1980s, the two parties agreed to render the election returns irrelevant: 
they would rotate the presidency, divide up cabinet posts equally between 
the two parties, and split the Supreme Court between their supporters46. The 
45 The situation in South African politics is not the existence of weak, incoherent parties, but rather 
the existence of a dominant party, the African National Congress (ANC), which has been in power 
continuously since the end of apartheid. This group had a huge hand in writing the country’s post-
apartheid constitution, and shares the general mission of social transformation that underlies the 
document. Thus the Constitutional Court has in the political branches what is basically a partner in 
constitutional development, rather than being confronted with incoherent political forces who ignore 
the document. For works on the South African political context, see, for example, Kimberly Lanegran, 
South Africa’s 1999 Election: Consolidating a Dominant Party System, in 48, Africa Today, 81 (2002); 
Hermann Giliomee et al., Dominant Party Rule, Opposition Parties and Minorities in South Africa, in 
8, Democratization, 161 (2001); Hermann Giliomee, South Africa’s Emerging Dominant-Party Regime, 
in 9, J. Democracy, 128 (1998).
46 For a more thorough accounting of the civil war and “Frente Nacional” periods, see, for example, 
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pact did end the conflict between the parties, but at a high price: First, social 
groups left outside the closed two-party system turned to armed conflict – 
the insurgent movements that have plagued modern Colombia grew rapidly 
during the “Frente Nacional” period47. Second, as inter-party competition 
became meaningless, intra-party competition gained in importance. The 
parties lost most of the coherent ideological identities they originally had; 
instead they became battlegrounds for rival factions, all organized around 
prominent families or individuals, to fight for positions of prominence within 
their own party48. These trends were bolstered by sets of electoral rules that 
were considered “the most personalistic in the world,”49 giving party lead-
ers little leverage over backbencher members of congress. Further, the rules 
seriously overrepresented the importance of rural districts, particularly in 
the lower house; in a country like Colombia, this further increased the im-
portance of clientelism and decreased the importance of partisan ideology50. 
The Colombian Congress was a classic example of a legislature that, to 
use Levinson and Pildes’s terminology, preferred to “abdicate” its power 
rather than to “empire build.”51 Major policy proposals did not originate in 
the legislature; virtually everything important was crafted by the president 
and his team of technocrats. Moreover, the legislature did not usually engage 
the president’s bills in an ideological way52. Still, it is important to stress that 
passing bills was not easy, because it required that the president shower in-
dividual legislators with sufficient amounts of pork and other particularistic 
benefits to buy their support. When, as commonly happened with important 
policy measures, presidents were unable to cobble together a sufficiently large 
coalition of legislators because of unwillingness or lack of resources, their 
proposals were blocked53. The president often used his sweeping emergency 
powers to legislate directly, bypassing congress altogether: between 1970 and 
1991, the country existed under some kind of a state of emergency 82 percent 
David Bushnell, The Making of Modern Colombia 201-248 (University of California Press, Los 
Angeles, 1993). 
47 See id. at 244-48. 
48 See Eduardo Pizarro, Giants with Feet of Clay: Political Parties in Colombia, in The Crisis of Demo-
cratic Representation in The Andes, 78 (Scott Mainwaring et al., eds., Standford university Press, 
Standford, 2006). 
49 John M. Carey & Matthew Soberg Shugart, Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering 
of Electoral Formulas, in 14, Elec. Stud. 417 (1995). See Ronald R. Archer & Matthew Shugart, The 
Unrealized Potential of Presidential Dominance in Colombia, in Presidentialism and Democracy in 
Latin America, 110, 133-6 (Scott Mainwaring & Matthew Soberg Shugart, eds., Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1997). 
50 See Archer & Shugart, supra note 49, at 140. 
51 See Daryl Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, in 118, Harv. L. Rev., 915 
(2005). 
52 See Archer & Shugart, supra note 49, at 144.
53 See id. at 116. 
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of the time54. Often, these states of emergency were not called to deal with 
genuine security crises, but rather to push through important economic or 
social reforms that were being blocked by congress55. Likewise, congress 
routinely abdicated huge swaths of its power to the president, delegating 
lawmaking over virtually unbounded policy areas to the executive56.
The problems with the Colombian Congress, then, were multifaceted, but 
all of the issues were ultimately rooted in the weakness of its party system. 
First, its approval of a bill said little about the bill’s compatibility with real 
social forces in Colombia, because Congress represented few of these groups 
other than rural bosses. Second, while the legislature could not initiate policy 
or participate in important policy debates, it could and did block lots of 
important pieces of legislation on dubious grounds (basically because a suf-
ficiently large coalition could not be bought by the president). In essence, it 
was a veto point in Colombian politics, but a low quality veto point, because 
its disapproval of the bill was unlikely to represent a clear social consensus 
against it57. 
2.2. Responses to Institutional Weakness
Politically the 1991 Constitutional Assembly marked a strange moment in 
Colombian history where old political lines appeared to be breaking down: 
the Liberals sent a fairly large contingent to the convention, but the Con-
servatives won only a few seats. Most of the remaining seats were won by 
the “Alianza Democrática M-19” (“Democratic Alliance M-19”), a political 
party created by former guerrilla group M-19 after the peace process, and 
the “Movimiento Salvación Nacional” (“National Salvation Movement”), a 
breakaway faction of the Conservatives58. 
At an overarching level, the convention was torn between two impulses 
that have since proven to be in considerable tension: constructing new institu-
54 See Rodrigo Uprimny, The Constitutional Court and Control of Presidential Emergency Powers 
in Colombia, in Democratization and the Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New 
Democracies 46, 65 tbl.3 (Siri Gloppen et al., eds., Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2004).
55 There were actually two distinct types of emergencies under the old constitution, the “State of 
Siege” for security crises and the “State of Economic Emergency” for economic crises. See Archer 
& Shugart, supra note 49, at 126-30. Both powers were often used by presidents to make an end-run 
around congressional blocking. See id. at 127, 129. 
56 See id. at 121-22; see also id. at 117. See also Hernando Valencia Villa, Es posible vivir sin Estado de 
Excepción, in 4, Revista de Derecho Público, Universidad de los Andes (1993). 
57 See George Tsebelis, Veto Players, How Political Institutions Work (Princenton University Press, 
Princenton, 2002). For our purposes, though, what matters is not simply whether an institution 
has the ability to veto policy, but also the quality of that veto point – does the veto represent the 
disapproval of some significant social group that democratic theorists ought to care about, or is it 
essentially random or based on the disapproval of groups that are unimportant from the standpoint 
of democratic theory. 
58 See, e. g., Archer & Shugart, supra note 49, at 148-52 & tbl.3.3. 
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tions and devices that would in some sense make an end run around the old 
ones, versus reforming old institutions to make them work better. The first 
impulse was reflected in the assembly’s writing of an extraordinarily extensive 
bill of rights, including many socio-economic rights and its creation of new 
institutions to enforce those rights, based on a suspicion that existing struc-
tures may not adequately enforce the constitution and transform Colombian 
society59. The assembly created a new “Defensor del Pueblo” (“Defender of 
the People”) or ombudsman charged with protecting constitutional rights by 
investigating wrongdoing, mobilizing public opinion, and filing judicial ac-
tions and strengthened the “Procuraduría General de la Nación” (“Attorney 
General”), which was given wide-ranging powers to investigate and root out 
constitutional violations by state officials60. As we will see below, the CCC 
has at times enlisted these actors as allies in its efforts. 
Most importantly, the Constitutional Assembly created the CCC itself, 
and gave this body exceptional powers – indeed, the Colombian Court must be 
by any measure one of the strongest courts in the world. The CCC has the power 
to hear abstract review petitions initiated at any time by any single citizen, rather 
than, as in México, solely at the conclusion of the legislative process by a minority 
of political actors61. Further, the CCC has the power to hear appeals from lower 
court dispositions of an individual complaint procedure called “acción de tutela.” 
“Tutelas” are inexpensive to bring, are heard very quickly, and can be used to 
enforce any of the “fundamental” rights in the constitution against any public 
actor and, in many situations, private actors as well62. The assembly constructed 
the CCC to ensure that the constitution would have force even if the traditional 
political actors were not reformed. Furthermore, in article 93 the Constitution 
states that international treaties on human rights are legally binding for national 
authorities and constitute relevant criteria for interpreting constitutional rights, 
the “bloque de constitucionalidad” (“constitutionality block”). 
The other motivation, reforming existing political institutions to make them 
work better, is also reflected at various points in the convention’s work. It shows 
in the assembly’s efforts to establish clearer rules for the president’s invocation 
and use of emergency powers and its efforts to give the congress an enlarged 
role in supervising and checking the president’s use of emergency powers, as 
well as in naming certain officials63. But the convention did not focus on the 
59 See Manuel José Cepeda, Introducción a la Constitución de 1991: hacia un nuevo constitucionalismo 
colombiano, 147-70 (Presidencia de la República, Bogotá, 1993). 
60 See id. at 101-02. See, e. g., Christopher S. Elmendorf, Advisory Counterparts to Constitutional 
Courts, in 56, Duke L.J., 953, 961-64 (2007). 
61 See Manuel José Cepeda, Judicial Activism in a Violent Context: The Origin, Role, and Impact of 
the Colombian Constitutional Court, in 3 Wash. U. Global Studies L. Rev. 529, 554- 557 (2004).
62 See id. at 552-554. 
63 See Const. Col., arts. 212-15; See Cepeda supra note 62, at 296. See Archer & Shugart, supra note 
58, at 128, 130.
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underlying causes of congressional dysfunction64. It made some superficial ef-
forts to “clean up” congress,65 but its changes to electoral rules actually made 
problems of legislative behavior worse, not better. The new rules maintained 
the open-list structure that gave parties little control over their candidates 
and allowed multiple lists from the same party66; moreover, the rules actually 
made it easier for transient movements, rather than established parties, to gain 
representation67. 
2.3. Political institutions since 1991 – continued 
deterioration of the party system
Unsurprisingly, then, parties have become significantly less institutional-
ized since 1991, and the behavior of the legislature has actually worsened 
significantly over the past fifteen years. The two traditional parties, although 
highly factionalized, at least occasionally operated as coherent entities, and 
gave some structure to Colombian politics. In the post-1991 period, the Co-
lombian party system has become increasingly deinstitutionalized (although 
also significantly more open to new interests)68. This process perhaps reached 
its apogee in 2002, when a former member of Liberal Party, as an outsider to 
the party system, Álvaro Uribe, was elected president. The two traditional 
parties have been in a long decline – neither is now a powerful entity. Two 
types of new political forces have filled this vacuum, but neither type bodes 
well for legislative performance. 
First, there are off-shoots and factions of the traditional rural, patronage-
based parties, now repackaged with new labels. These parties are personalistic 
64 See. Rodrigo Uprimny, Constitución de 1991, Estado Social y Derechos Humanos: promesas in-
cumplidas, diagnóstico y perspectivas, in El Debate de la Constitución, 71 (Universidad Nacional de 
Colombia, Instituto Latinoamericano de Servicios Legales Alternativos, Bogotá, 2002). 
65 For example, it outlawed one of the devices used by the president to “buy” individual legislators, the 
notorious auxilios parliamentarios or discretionary funds given to legislators for whatever project 
they desired. See Const. Col., art. 136, cl. 4. Despite the bar, funds of this kind continue to exist 
under different names. See Leongomez, supra note 48, at 78, 96 n. 25.
66 See Leongomez, supra note 48, at 84 & n. 17 (noting that a 1994 law technically gave party lists 
control over the party label but that, in fact, “the traditional parties, as well as many new parties, 
make indiscriminate endorsements.”); see also Brian F. Crisp, “The Nature of Representation in 
Andean Legislatures and Attempts at Institutional Reengineering, in The Crisis of Democratic Rep-
resentation in The Andes, 78 (Scott Mainwaring et al., eds., Standford university Press, Standford, 
2006). (Listing the failure to eliminate intra-party lists as a failing of the 1991 convention). A law 
that took effect in 2006 mandated one list per party per district, see id. at 219 n. 4, but it is unclear 
how much of an impact this law will have, given that factions can run as separate parties. Up to now, 
one study has found that the reform significantly reduced the number of lists in the 2006 election. 
See Matthew Soberg Shugart, Erika Moreno, & Luis Fajardo, Deepening Democracy by Renovat-
ing Political Practices: The Struggle for Electoral Reform in Colombia (March 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
67 See Const. Col., art. 108.
68 See Leongomez, supra note 48, at 88 & tbl. 3.3 
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and led by the same types of politicians who would have led factions in the 
Liberal or Conservative party69. The difference is that they are even less tied to 
a coherent party label than before. As in the pre-1991 period, these legislators 
have little interest in making national-level policy. As a whole, their parties 
tend to be fairly small (because they are linked around individual actors who 
generally have support in only one region of the country), and they tend to 
appear and disappear fairly frequently, showing little longevity. Further, 
empirical evidence suggests that party discipline remains quite low within 
these kinds of parties, so they are not capable of voting as a coherent block70. 
The second kind of legislator in the new congress belongs to what various 
authors have called the “electoral micro-enterprise.”71 These are very small 
bands of political figures with predominantly urban support; they tend to be 
led by a celebrity-turned politician, like famous journalists or human rights 
advocates. These actors, on the surface, have considerable promise for making 
broad policy decisions; many of them were elected precisely because of their 
views on important questions. However, isolated figures interested in broad 
political questions cannot by themselves create a functioning legislature, at 
least on most issues. Without parties to tie them together and forge coali-
tions, these micro-enterprise legislators have great difficulty getting anything 
done at the institutional level. Moreover, the lack of a real party label in these 
micro-enterprises weakens the link between elected representatives and their 
constituents; it is hard for people to know what they are getting when they 
cast a vote. 
Several studies, then, have indicated that the behavior of the legislature as 
a body is worse than before 1991. Most proposals initiated by legislators are 
either symbolic measures or pork-barrel measures targeted at a particular 
geographic constituency; virtually all important national policy proposals 
continue to be initiated by the executive72; and it is evident that Congress 
does not care about the Constitution because it wants to avoid the political 
costs involved in monitoring legislation for constitutionality. Thus, partially 
because of incomplete reforms and partially because of durable elements of 
political culture, the congress has maintained its traditional role as a blocker 
of presidential policy73 rather than as an initiator or dialoguer on national 
69 See id. at 90-91.
70 See Crisp, supra note 66, at 218. 
71 See id. at 90-91. 
72 See Pizarro Leongomez, supra note 48, at 92 (citing a study which showed that 78 percent of bills 
proposed by legislators between July 1998 and July 1999 had a strictly local or regional focus, while 
only 22 percent addressed national issues at all); see also Erika Moreno, Whither the Colombian 
two-party system? An assessment of political reforms and their limits, in, 24, Electoral Studies, 485 
(2005) (finding via a study of bill initiation patterns that the new parties behaved like the old ones). 
73 See id. at 91 (noting that fragmentation and legislative indiscipline combine to force “constant 
negotiation between the government and individual members of congress,” which “drastically 
increases the transaction costs of moving legislation forward”).
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policy initiatives, and as a body willing to abdicate national power to the 
executive in exchange for particularistic payoffs. 
3. THE ccc’s RESPONSES TO THE 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT
3.1. The CCC in front of the institutional context
The ccc often complains that the legislature is not acting like a delibera-
tive body. An example is an important case in 2003 where the ccc on abstract 
review struck down reforms to the country’s value-added tax that would have 
broadened the base to include certain everyday items (like milk) that had 
previously been exempt. The ccc criticized the legislature harshly for simply 
accepting a last-minute executive proposal without debating it substantively. 
Indeed, the ccc stated that the reform “was the result of an indiscriminate 
decision to tax a great quantity of completely different goods and services 
that was not accompanied by even a minimum of legislative deliberation, 
raising the principle of ‘no taxation without representation’…”74. 
Second, the Court’s discourse shows an awareness that legislative bargain-
ing is about pork and not policy. In a decision upholding the constitutionality 
of what were essentially payoffs from the executive into funds that individual 
legislators could use for whatever they wished, the ccc noted the “reason-
ableness” and “empirical rationality” of the following argument presented 
by an intervener, although it claimed to balk somewhat at accepting all of 
its normative implications75. 
The ccc and its supporters have drawn from this a new theory of separa-
tion of powers that focuses on the Court’s role as a check on the executive 
branch and even as a direct setter of policies based on substantive values 
derived from the constitutional text. In a famous case from 199276 where the 
ccc announced it would enforce socio-economic rights using the “Acción de 
tutela” under certain conditions, it stated: 
The difficulties deriving from the overflowing power of the executive in our 
modern state and the loss of political leadership of the legislature should be com-
pensated, in a constitutional democracy, with the strengthening of the judicial 
power, which is perfectly placed to control and defend the constitutional order. 
74 C-776/03, Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa. 
75 C-1168/01, Justice Eduardo Montealegre Lynett.
76 T-406/92, Justice Ciro Angarita Barón. 
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This is the only way to construct a true equilibrium and collaboration between 
the powers; otherwise, the executive will dominate.
In other words, in an institutional order where the legislature was structur-
ally incapable of checking the executive, a strengthened judiciary was the best 
hope to do so. Further, in the absence of “legislative action,” the ccc must 
“give force” to constitutional principles, developing and directly enforcing 
even socio-economic rights: “It’s clear that in principle in all of these cases 
the judge decides something that corresponds to the legislature. However … 
the lack of a solution from the organ that has the faculty to decide, makes it 
possible for another body, in this case the judiciary, to decide.”77 
Thus, the ccc has held that although separation of powers is an important 
principle in Colombian constitutional law, it is a flexible doctrine – the ccc 
tends to emphasize the duty of the branches to “harmoniously collaborate” 
in achieving constitutional goals, rather than their rigid separation78. The 
forefront of the Court’s consciousness, as “guardian of the supremacy of 
the Constitution,”79 is whether society and the state are coming closer to the 
constitutional vision established in 1991; separation of powers is merely a tool 
for approaching that constitutional vision. As we will see repeatedly below, 
the judiciary will step in to re-establish the constitutional vision when the 
other branches fail to act or act improperly. Ensuring any particular concep-
tion of judicial role is subordinated to the overriding goal of ensuring that 
constitutional change occurs.
3.2. The ccc’s failed attempts to “fix” 
legislative dysfunctionality 
The basis for the ccc’s doctrines is the idea of deliberation: the Colom-
bian Congress “should be … a space of public reason,” even if the legislature’s 
actual behavior is wildly divergent from that end80. In other words, decisions 
should be made on the floor, not in back-room deals or party-based pacts: 
“the validity of a majority decision does not reside solely in the fact that it has 
77 Id. Major supporters of the Court have echoed this analysis. For example, Manuel Jose Cepeda, 
former Court’s president, noted that two major sources of the Court’s power were (1) the “central 
position that the President had traditionally exercised … over the Congress, which diminishes – and 
in many cases distorts – the system of checks and balances between the political branches,” and (2) 
“the perception that [politics] is clientelistic and beneficial for the politicians and not for ordinary 
people. ….. Citizens rarely think that laws represent the consensus of society or of a solid political 
majority.” See. Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, Polémicas Constitucionales, 241- 242 (Legis Editores, 
Bogotá, 2007). 
78 See, e. g., T-068/98, Justice Alejandro Martínez Caballero; T-025/04, Justice Manuel José Cepeda 
Espinosa.
79 See T-068/98, Justice Alejandro Martínez Caballero. 
80 C-816/04, Justice Jaime Córdoba Triviño & Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes.
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been adopted by a majority, but also in that it has been publicly deliberated 
and discussed”81. Two lines of doctrine spring from these principles. In the 
first, narrower line, the ccc focuses on preventing executive manipulation 
of the legislative process. The second line is aimed at the lack of legislative 
deliberation even in the absence of executive interference. 
The court will strike down legislative enactments because chamber lead-
ership did not offer time for debate; for example, where the chair formally 
opens debate but then immediately closes it and proceeds to a vote before 
any statements have been made82. Also, the ccc will strike down bills where 
the chamber leadership has failed to read into the record, print in the legisla-
tive journal, or otherwise publicize the content of bills to be voted on, on the 
grounds that this precludes informed debate and voting83. Finally, the ccc 
will strike down amendments to a bill made on the floor if it appears that a 
committee declined to debate the provisions at issue, but instead was trying 
to pass the buck to a later stage of the legislative process84.
These doctrines have blocked a lot of important policy measures85; little 
has been achieved in return. The ccc is faced with the obvious difficulty of 
using a weak instrument – legislative procedure – to fix a deep structural 
problem, rooted in the party system and political culture. As noted by one 
Colombian legal scholar, the main problem with legislative debate is not that 
it fails to occur, but rather that it is “disorganized and ineffective” because of 
the weakness of the country’s parties and thus the legislature’s failure to co-
alesce into coherent ideological bands86. The ccc cannot radically strengthen 
parties via judicial decision87. The doctrine aimed at executive interference 
is equally ineffectual because of problems of detection. 
81 Id. at § VII.137; see also id. at § VII.138; id. at § 127 (quoting C-222/97). 
82 See C-754/04, Justice Álvaro Tafur Galvis; C-668/04, Justice Alfredo Beltrán Sierra.
83 See, e. g., C-760/01, Justice Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra & Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa. 
(Araujo Renteria, J., concurring in the judgment). 
84 See C-801/03 Justice Jaime Córdoba Triviño. See C-370/04, Justice Jaime Córdoba Triviño & Álvaro 
Tafur Galvis (Cepeda Espinosa, J., dissenting), (explaining the doctrinal evolution). Justice Manuel 
José Cepeda Espinosa, one of the founders of this doctrine, argued that it has become too broad, 
and now has the effect of  “punishing parliamentary creativity and petrifying legislative projects 
to what was decided in the first debate.” Id.
85 See, e. g., C-332/05, Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa; C-754/04, Justice Álvaro Tafur Galvis 
(striking down key parts of a law aimed at reducing pension payouts); C-668/04, Justice Alfredo 
Beltrán Sierra (constitutional rules for structuring elected local government institutions); C-372/04, 
Justice Clara Inés Vargas Hernández (constitutional amendment changing congressional powers); 
C-370/04, Justice Jaime Córdoba Triviño & Álvaro Tafur Galvis (VAT tax exemptions for agricul-
tural products); C-1147/03, Justice Rodrigo Escobar Gil (VAT tax on gambling products); C-801/03, 
Justice Jaime Córdoba Triviño (parts of a bill aimed at making labor laws more flexible); C-760/01, 
Justice Rodrigo Escobar Gil (July 18, 2001) (amendments to the criminal code). 
86 Faiber Eucario Falla Casanova, Algunas consideraciones sobre el principio democrático y la función 
legislativa parlamentaria en Colombia, in Primeras Jornadas de Derecho Constitucional y Adminis-
trativo 201, 216, 221 (Universidad Externado de Colombia, Bogotá, 2001). 
87 We do not argue that judicial doctrine has no impact on the party system. For example, much of 
the edifice of electoral law in the United States is based on the assumption that they can. Nor do 
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The ccc has also developed doctrines that have sharply cut down on the 
president’s ability to make policy autonomously (ie. without going through the 
legislative process), either via delegated power88 or via emergency decree. The 
ccc has held that legislative delegations of extraordinary power are disfavored 
and must be read “restrictively” in all contexts89; it has held that its goal is 
to “reduce the capacity of the government to exercise legislative functions 
through congressional delegation.”90 Thus, the ccc has developed powerful 
doctrines voiding delegations as insufficiently precise (a Colombian version 
of the non-delegation doctrine) 91 and limiting their scope92. 
In the emergency powers area, the raw statistics amply demonstrate judi-
cial activism: of twelve presidential declarations of states of emergency since 
1991, the ccc has completely struck down three and partially struck down 
three more. Moreover, even when the ccc has upheld a declaration of a state 
of emergency, it has often struck down substantive decrees issued while the 
declaration was in effect93. Further, most of the judicial approvals of decree 
powers occurred in the early years of the Court’s existence: it completely 
upheld five of six decrees between 1992 and 1994, but has since struck down, 
at least partially, five of six declarations of emergency94. The country spent 
82 percent of the time under some kind of presidential state of emergency 
we mean to imply that judicial control of legislative procedure is always futile – it may be, as Cass 
Sunstein has argued, that judges can and should force legislators to deliberate certain issues. See, 
e. g., Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, in 67, U. Chi. L. Rev., 315 (2000). Our point here is 
simpler: where the problems in legislative performance are rooted in deep problems with the party 
system like those found in Colombia, judicial improvement of legislative performance is almost 
impossible.
88 Colombian presidents have several types of delegated decree power: they can make decrees that are 
equal in rank to statutes after being delegated extraordinary powers by the legislature, or they can 
create administrative decrees with a rank that is lesser than congressional statutes by elaborating 
or regulating those statutes themselves. See Alexi Julio Estrada, Las ramas ejecutiva y judicial del 
Poder público en la Constitución colombiana de 1991, 75-88 (Universidad Externado de Colombia, 
Bogotá, 2003). We are discussing the first type of delegated power here; use of the second power 
is reviewed by a different body, the “Consejo de Estado” (“Council of State”- Colombia’s high 
administrative court), and so we do not treat it.
89 See, e. g., C-1152/05, Justice Clara Inés Vargas Hernández; C-702/99, Justice Fabio Morón Díaz.
90 C-702/99, Justice Fabio Morón Díaz.§ VI.4.1, ¶ 20.
91 Like other Courts who have tried to enforce a non-delegation doctrine, see David P. Currie, The 
Constitution of The Federal Republic of Germany, 133 (The University Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1994). For Colombian cases, see, for example, C-097/03, Justice Manuel José Cepeda; C-1493/00, 
Justice Carlos Gaviria Diaz ; C-1374/00, Justice José Gregorio Hernández .
92 See, e. g., C-1152/05, Justice Clara Inés Vargas Hernández; C-734/05, Justice Rodrigo Escobar Gil; 
see also Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, supra note 63, at 636 n. 299 (listing cases). 
93 See, e. g., Miguel Revenga Sánchez & Emilia Girón Reguera, La Corte Constitucional colombiana 
ante las medidas de seguridad y defensa nacional del gobierno de Uribe, in 6, Revista de Estudios 
Socio- Jurídicos, 29, 40-49 (2004). 
94 Rodrigo Uprimny, The Constitutional Court and Control of Executive Emergency Powers in Colombia, 
in Democratization and The Judiciary: The Accountability Function of Courts in New Democracies, 
46, 57 tbl. 1 (Siri Gloppen et al., eds., Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2004).
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in the 1980s, but it has spent only 17.5 percent of the time under such a state 
between 1991 and 200295. 
Commentators have hailed the Court’s emergency powers jurisprudence 
as “one of [its] most important and original interventions.”96 But this kind 
of structural jurisprudence – which aims to push all policymaking through 
the legislature – ignores the problem of legislative weakness. Like executive 
manipulation of the policy process, autonomous executive policymaking has 
historically been a coping mechanism because of serious problems in legisla-
tive performance. So long as the legislature remains dysfunctional, forcing 
all policy through the legislature simply adds a low quality veto point to the 
policymaking process, and is likely to block a significant number of bills 
without achieving positive results97. Historically, Colombian governments 
have used emergency decrees to deal with severe economic crises; the congress 
functioned so poorly that the president would often pass these bills alone. 
Understanding this need, the framers of the 1991 constitution created a “social 
and economic emergency,” which was meant to deal with socio-economic 
(rather than security) crises98. The ccc has severely limited this device by 
confining it to situations where there has been a significant exogenous shock 
to the system, like a natural disaster. For example, in 1997, the ccc struck 
down the government’s attempt to declare a state of economic emergency in 
order to deal with serious balance of payments problems, largely caused by an 
increasing fiscal deficit, which threatened the economy99. The ccc emphasized 
that the problem was a “structural” one, with a “prolonged duration,” and 
held that “the expansive use of exceptional powers to resolve structural or 
chronic problems” was constitutionally prohibited. Structural problems were 
95 See id. at 65 tbl. 3.
96 Id. at 47.
97 The Court’s emergency powers jurisprudence is not devoid of merit. As Tushnet argues, there are 
two ways for a court to control emergency power: it can independently review executive action for 
substantive rights concerns, or it can attempt to place structural controls on executive action, tell-
ing the executive that he must go to congress to get what he wants. See Mark Tushnet, The Politi-
cal Constitution of Emergency Powers, in 91, Minn. L. REV., 1451 (2007). Much of the Colombian 
jurisprudence is purely structural, and this is inappropriate given legislative dysfunctionality. But 
some of the cases, particularly those where the president has invoked the “state of internal com-
motion” meant to deal with the ongoing insurgency, are really about rights. The Court is telling 
the political branches that what they want to do is unconstitutional, regardless of source. See, e. 
g., C-300/94, Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz. In our view, this kind of judicial supervision suits 
the institutional context well and is part of the legislative substitution strategy outlined below, 
because the Court is conducting its own substantive review of the measures rather than deferring 
to congressional controls. 
98 Const. Col., art. 215. The assembly also provided for two other states of emergency – the state of 
internal commotion and the state of external war. The first was meant to deal with serious internal 
unrest related to things like Colombia’s ongoing guerrilla insurgency, while the second, which has 
never been used, was meant to deal with states of emergency during wartime. See Const. Col., arts. 
213-14. 
99 See C-122/97, Justice Antonio Barrera Carbonell & Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz.
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generally meant to be dealt with via the constitutionally “privileged” route of 
ordinary democratic debate in the congress, which was the “natural forum 
for discussing and resolving critical [economScholars have found evidence 
for a link in Colombia between the post-1991 jurisprudence, which gives the 
president little ability to act unilaterally in economic matters, and worsening 
fiscal deficits100. The economic crisis of the late 1990s did not pass quickly, 
but rather threw Colombia into one of the worst recessions in its history; 
further, many key economic reforms could not be pushed through congress 
until President Álvaro Uribe took office in 2002101. 
3.3. The ccc as a Partial Replacement for the Legislature 
3.3.1. Policy Initiation
 
The ccc commonly steps in when it feels that other branches of government 
are not initiating policy in key areas. Most famously, it decided a series of cases 
in the 1999-2000 period that forced an overhaul of the mortgage system. The 
background here is a crisis in that system, due both to rising interest rates and 
declining real wages (the underlying causes were the same fiscal and financial 
crises that spurred the presidential decrees discussed above). A large number 
of mortgagees (perhaps 200,000102) had either gone into default or were in 
danger of defaulting in the previous several years, and the elected branches 
had not formulated any response – the president was preoccupied with the 
macroeconomic and mortgage crises from the standpoint of the state, the in-
ternational financial agencies, and the financial sector, while Congress was too 
dysfunctional to swing into motion. An important component of the system 
was a formula, upac, which re-equilibrated mortgage contracts annually given 
inflation rates in the previous year. In a historically moderate to high inflation 
environment like Colombia, this adjustment formula was necessary to permit 
a market for long-term financing; in its absence, uncertainty around future 
inflation might prevent most mortgage contracts from existing. The Central 
Bank had discretion, in accordance with guidelines set by a 1993 delegated 
decree, to determine these adjustments.
The ccc acted immediately to reduce overall interest rates by attacking 
aspects of the upac formula. In its first decision, it held unconstitutional a pro-
100 See Mauricio Cárdenas ét al., Political Institutions and Policy Outcomes in Colombia: The Effects 
of the 1991 Constitution, in Policymaking in Latin America, 199, 228 (Ernesto Stein & Mariano 
Tommasi, eds., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2008).
101 See Juan José Echaverria ét al., Recent Economic History of Colombia, in Institutional Reforms: The 
Case of Colombia, 33, 34-35 (Alberto Alesina, ed., The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005). 
102 See Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, The Enforcement of Social Rights by the Colombian Constitutional 
Court: Cases and Debates, in Courts and Social Transformation in New Democracies,127, 136 (Roberto 
Gargarella et al., eds., Ashgate Pub Co., England, 2006). 
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vision that required the Central Bank to set upac adjustments in accordance 
with the interest rates found in the economy103. There was a difference, the 
ccc noted, between the inflation rate (which measured the purchasing power 
of money) and the interest rate (which measured returns to money) – the latter 
was typically higher because of returns to capital and risk. Thus, the interest 
rate measure “destroyed” the balance between debtor and creditor, and ran 
contrary to the promotion of housing, a constitutionally protected value. In 
other substantive decisions, the ccc also banned the capitalization of interest 
in mortgages and prepayment penalties in mortgages, holding that these too 
overburdened homeowners104.
In yet another decision from September 1999, the ccc stretched existing 
doctrines105 to find that the existing upac regulations had been improperly 
promulgated by the president when a statute was required. It thus held the 
entire set of existing regulations unconstitutional, but delayed erasing them 
from the legal order until the end of the then-current legislative term (in 
2000)106. As several dissenters pointed out, it was evident that the Court’s 
real motivation was to force legal changes to the entire structure, including 
some provisions that would have been difficult to strike down substantively107. 
Also, the ccc ordered that its prior substantive jurisprudence on calculating 
the upac formulas be given immediate effect, and that debtors receive refunds 
on any excessive interest they might have paid in the past; thus debtors were 
given some immediate relief from the crisis108. 
The president presented a new law to the Congress in about one month, in 
October 1999, which was passed in the early part of 2000. The law incorpo-
rated the Court’s earlier substantive jurisprudence – it banned capitalization, 
pre-payment penalties, and required that the new upac system reflect only 
changes in the rate of inflation – and made all of these changes retroactive, 
thus reimbursing debtors for overpayments109. It also incorporated a myriad 
103 See C-383/99, Justice Alfredo Beltrán Sierra.
104 See C-747/99, Justice Alfredo Beltrán Sierra (capitalization); C-252/98, Justice Carmenza Isaza de 
Gómez (prepayment).
105 As the dissenters pointed out, the Court easily could have come to the opposite conclusion. The 
majority held that the basic financial regulations, including the upac guidelines, constitutionally 
constituted a ley marco that under the 1991 constitution had to be established by the legislature. 
Thus, the president’s legislation of the rules via delegated decree powers was void. See C-700/99, 
Justice José Gregorio Hernández Galindo (Sept. 16, 1999), § VII.3. The trouble with the holding is that 
the 1993 decree merely integrated existing statutory material from several sources and renumbered 
it; nothing new was added to the system. See id. (Cifuentes Munoz & Naranjo Mesa, dissenting). 
The Court had held previously, with respect to this very same statute, that such a power is not an 
attempt to create a ley marco, because it involves no substantive power or discretion. See id.
106 See C-700/99, Justice José Gregorio Hernández Galindo § VII.5. 
107 See id. (Cifuentes Muñoz & Naranjo Mesa, dissenting).
108 See C-700/99, Justice José Gregorio Hernández Galindo.
109 See C-955/00, Justice José Gregorio Hernández Galindo (July 26, 2000) (citing Law 546 of 1999, §§ 
3, 17). 
Vniversitas. Bogotá (Colombia) N° 119: 55-92, julio-diciembre de 2009.
78 DaviD LanDau / JuLián DanieL López-Murcia
of other provisions that the ccc had not explicitly required but which it liked, 
such as an infusion of state money to help cash-strapped debtors. Still, in 
the end the ccc made extensive and creative use of the conditional decision 
doctrine – which allows the court to condition the constitutionality of a bill 
on the grounds that it be interpreted a certain way – in order to effectively 
re-write large portions of the statute. Most importantly, it imposed specific 
caps on interest rates in housing, requiring that they be no higher than the 
lowest real interest rate being charged in the financial system. It also required 
that the bailouts for debtors who were already late on payments be the same 
as those for debtors who were not.
The end product of the Court’s work was fairly successful: it succeeded 
in forcing a far-reaching reform to the housing finance system that was more 
favorable to debtors, and it protected many of the existing debtors. Yet the 
decision was criticized on several grounds. Dissenters in these cases, as well 
as others, argued that the ccc was trying to solve social problems, rather than 
acting much like a Constitutional Court. The dissenters admitted that the 
UPAC system had become a disaster and that the political branches were not 
fixing the problem, but they argued that the ccc would ultimately weaken its 
own legitimacy if it started acting like a legislature110.
That the ccc is indeed taking on such a role was made clear by some of its 
procedural innovations in the case. In July 1999, it held a public hearing in the 
style of a legislative committee or an administrative agency, in which in heard 
from about 25 leaders or officials, including the ombudsman, the Minister 
of Housing, the Head of the Colombian Central Bank, several deputies and 
senators, the heads of various trade groups, and the head of a labor union 
association111. In addition, throughout the process the ccc requested – and 
received – written comments on the problem at issue from a extraordinary 
number of figures, including economists, academics, public officials, and 
civil society groups112. Finally, the ccc received a lot of information about the 
mortgage crisis from the high number of “tutelas” it received on the topic. 
These mechanisms probably solved, at least partially, informational deficits 
the ccc faced. 
The ccc was also criticized for using its housing jurisprudence to primarily 
benefit the middle class, rather than the very poor113. Again, this is true – only 
110 C-383/99, Justice Alfredo Beltrán Sierra (Beltrán Sierra, J., dissenting).
111 See C-700/99, Justice José Gregorio Hernández; Salomon Kalmanovitz, La Corte Constitucional y 
la capitalización de intereses, 2 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (“The public audience 
replaced the Congress in convoking presumably all the involved interests, but the problem is that it 
did not allow for proportional representation based on universal suffrage, but rather the positions 
with which the Court agrees.”)
112 See C-955/00, Justice José Gregorio Hernández; C-700/99, Justice José Gregorio Hernández.
113 See Kalmanovitz, supra note 111, at 8 (“The poorest people who have access to their own homes 
via loan sharks outside the official system …, and which are charged 4 or 5 times the interest rate 
within the system because of high risks of non-payment, did not benefit at all from these sentences. 
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the middle class, and not the poor, had mortgages, at least within the formal 
sector. It is also a fairly general feature of the Court’s work: while the ccc does 
protect extremely marginalized groups and has developed some representation-
reinforcing constitutional theory to justify its work, many of its most impor-
tant interventions have been on behalf of more middle class groups114. Yet in a 
political system that functions as poorly as the Colombian system, this is not 
necessarily an indictment of the Court’s work. When the ccc protects middle-
class groups from mortgage defaults and salary reductions, it is protecting 
groups that should have had recourse within the political process, had that 
process functioned well. But the fact is that the Colombian system often does 
not function well115.
A final point is that the Court’s work here is different than the “dialogi-
cal” model of socio-economic rights-enforcement used, for example, in South 
Africa and described by Tushnet and others116. The ccc’s strategy involved 
some cooperation from the other branches, particularly the president, but 
its primary goal was not to catalyze democratic processes, but rather to take 
whatever action it deemed necessary to solve the policy problem. Thus the 
ccc was not afraid to issue precise directives from early on in the process 
or to extensively revise the bill that came out of the legislature. Again, this 
kind of approach seems more reasonable where the legislature’s ability to 
substantively engage the bill was limited by the weaknesses of its parties.
3.3.2. Supervision of Major Policy Initiatives
 
The ccc has not been content to simply push new policy ideas into the system; 
it has also spent considerable effort on supervising the enforcement of these 
policies. Its chief tool in this respect has been the “state of unconstitutional 
conditions” doctrine. When the ccc declares a state of unconstitutional condi-
tions, it holds that the treatment of a broad class of people, who are impacted 
by a range of institutions, is unconstitutional117. The state of unconstitutional 
The still poorer who live in the slums … were also left unprotected.”). Even defenders of the Court’s 
socio-economic work have noted that the housing decisions mainly benefited middle-class groups. 
See Uprimny, supra note 102, at 136 (noting that “[t]he debtors were largely from the middle class”).
114 See, e. g., C-1433/00, Justice Antonio Barrera Carbonell. 
115 Scheppele, using the Hungarian example, offers a reason why domestic political actors often ignore 
middle-class groups in the developing world. See Kim Lane Scheppele, A Realpolitik Defense of 
Social Rights, in 82, Tex. L. Rev., 1921 (2004). Executives are heavily pressured by international 
organizations, which want them to cut costs and are often hostile to social spending targeting the 
middle class. Other domestic institutions, like legislatures, should stand up for these groups; but 
problems of representation are often serious enough to prevent them from doing so. Thus the Court 
acts as the catalyst for a broad set of domestic interests that is wholly excluded from the rest of the 
process. 
116 See, e. g., Mark Thushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights, 227-64 (2008); Michael C. Dorf & Charles 
F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, in 98, Colum. L. Rev., 267 (1998). 
117 See, e. g., T-025/04, Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa (Jan. 22, 2004), § III.7 (explaining the 
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conditions jurisprudence bears great resemblance to the American structural 
injunction, but on a bigger scale and in a more centralized manner. While 
American structural injunctions are typically supervised by individual district 
courts and typically involve institutions in one locality, the ccc itself super-
vises states of unconstitutional conditions, and often declares them over the 
reach of the entire country and for a nation-wide class118. Also, while states 
of unconstitutional conditions have sometimes been called to deal with prob-
lems involving groups that might be poorly represented in a well-functioning 
system, like prisoners and refugees displaced by civil conflict119, it has also 
been used to deal with groups that should be politically powerful, like pension 
recipients and lawyers trying to become notaries120. The ccc views the state of 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine less in terms of remedies for particular 
parties, and more in terms of an entire state of affairs being out of compli-
ance with the constitution. The doctrine is thus consistent with the Court’s 
vision of the constitution as a transformative document and with its role as 
the chief mechanism for ensuring that constitutional aspiration and reality 
move towards lining up. It is also consistent with a conception of judicial role 
that relies on the “harmonious cooperation” between the branches, rather 
than a pre-defined set of roles. 
The case of the internally displaced persons is perhaps the most illustrative. It 
is estimated that there are perhaps three million people living in Colombia who 
are currently displaced from their homes due to the country’s civil conflict121. 
The Colombian state has typically done very little for these people, despite the 
myriad of problems they face – they have trouble receiving food, shelter, or 
medical care, their children are often left uneducated, they face serious safety 
problems, they generally have trouble reestablishing rights to land that they 
have been forced to abandon, and they are often pressured to go back to their 
homes well before it is safe to do so122. So, the problem is classically polycentric; 
hardly the stuff we would expect a court to be willing or able to take on. But in 
2005, the ccc declared a state of unconstitutional conditions with respect to all 
internally displaced persons in the country, holding after a statistical review that 
the problems that population faced were massive and that the state response, 
in terms of capacity and budget, was “gravely deficient.”123 
doctrine’s roots and applicability). 
118 See, e.g., T-025/04, Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa (displaced persons); T-153/98 (prisoners).
119 See T-025/04, Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa (refugees); T-153/98 (prisoners). 
120 See SU-090/00, Justice Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz (pensions); T-1650/00, Justice Fabio Morón Díaz 
(notaries). 
121 See Jennifer Easterday, Litigation or Legislation: Protecting the Rights of Internally Displaced Persons 
in Colombia, 5 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
122 See id. at 6-7; Julián Daniel López-Murcia & Juana Inés Acosta López, Asistencia estatal a los 
desplazados y reparaciones en el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, 8 International Law. 
Revista Colombiana de Derecho Internacional, 161-194 (2006).
123 See T-025/04, Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa §§ iii.6.2-6.3. Article 2 of the Colombian Consti-
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The ccc declared the state only after receiving a flood of “tutelas” deal-
ing with a particular issue over a sustained period of time124. Thus, as in the 
housing cases, the ccc has been able to leverage its easily-accessible individual 
complaint mechanism to get good information about widespread problems 
raised by Colombian society. Since declaring the state, the ccc has used a 
variety of techniques to get reasonable policy-relevant information. It has 
issued numerous orders in the case subsequently; most of these orders have 
requested information from the various agencies, particularly about how 
much money they are spending on the problem and how they are spending it125. 
The ccc has also relied heavily on a set of friendly national and transnational 
ngo’s and on allied institutions created by the 1991 constitution, especially 
the “Procuraduría General de la Nación” and the “Defensor del Pueblo”, to 
monitor the performance of the agencies and to write reports, excerpts of 
which it has often appended to its subsequent orders126. And, as in the housing 
case, it has held several legislative-style hearing involving these groups and 
the administrative agencies127. Finally, the ccc has loosened standing rules to 
allow third-parties (particularly ngo’s) to bring “tutelas” on behalf of groups 
of displaced people128. The result, then, is that the ccc has placed itself at the 
head of a coalition of allied governmental and non-governmental institutions 
to amass and systematize huge amounts of information and to put itself in a 
position to issue more specific orders where action has been delayed. 
Remedially, the ccc has gone well beyond merely pointing out the con-
stitutional principles at issue. It has issued detailed guidelines for how other 
branches should implement the right. Thus, as with the mortgage cases, the 
ccc here has interacted significantly with other government actors, but its 
work does not fit the classic “dialogic” model where the ccc points out the 
tution holds that “guaranteeing the effectiveness of the principles, duties, and rights consecrated in 
the Constitution” is an “essential duty of the state”; the Court held that this created a positive duty 
on the state to do something about the displaced persons problem, even if it did not bear primary 
responsibility for creating the problem. See id. § iii.8. 
124 See id. § iii. 7.
125 See, e. g., auto 337/06 (requesting information on actual and proposed statistical indicators to mea-
sure the scope of the problem); auto 218/06 (ordering the agencies to produce reports on compliance 
with prior Court orders in the case); auto 176/05, app. (summarizing prior reports required by the 
Court from various governmental organizations). An Auto is a decision that the Court issues on 
its own accord, exercising its inherent administrative powers or its jurisdiction over an open case.
126 See, e. g., auto 178/05, app. (summarizing reports or testimony that the Court had received from 
the “Procuraduría General de la Nación”, the “Defensor del Pueblo”, several bar associations, and 
myriad civil society groups). 
127 See auto 236/07 (calling such a hearing); auto 178/05 (describing the contents of a prior hearing). 
The Court has also tried to mandate that civil society groups have a hand in drafting new programs. 
See, e. g., auto 92/08 (ordering agencies to create new programs, and requiring that they “adopt 
a public participatory hearing” before they begin planning the program, that they subsequently 
write a report to the Court explaining how civil society groups participated in the planning, and 
that they ensure these groups are designed in implementing the programs as well). 
128 See Easterday, supra note 121, at 45. 
Vniversitas. Bogotá (Colombia) N° 119: 55-92, julio-diciembre de 2009.
82 DaviD LanDau / JuLián DanieL López-Murcia
right violated and leaves most of the implementation to the political branches, 
and particularly the legislature. Instead, the ccc is acting as a manager of the 
relevant agencies over a long period of time, using allied institutions and civil 
society groups as sources of information and policy. Moreover, the ccc has 
not viewed the legislature as a key figure in its interactions; the ccc stressed 
that it was not calling for any new legislation, and instead has focused on 
issuing orders to a group of agencies with jurisdiction over the topic129. The 
overall conception of the “unconstitutional state of conditions” doctrine is in 
harmony with the Court’s general view that separation of powers in Colombia 
must be flexible, and should be subordinated to the more important goal of 
constitutional enforcement. 
It is difficult, and really too soon, to evaluate the work of the ccc in this 
area, but based on the views of commentators it seems to have achieved 
some real – albeit limited – results. There have been substantial increases in 
funding spent on the problem, and increases in other statistical areas, like 
the percent of displaced children attending school and receiving medical 
care130. Better statistics are now being kept on the size of the population and 
its characteristics and needs. Progress has, of course, been fairly slow, and 
the ccc has been reluctant to utilize contempt mechanisms, recognizing the 
complexity of the problem131. But the Court’s approach has had an impact. 
3.3.3. Checking the Executive 
Given that the legislature does not act as a productive, substantive check on 
executive decision-making, the ccc itself has had to shoulder much of this 
burden. The Court’s development of an extremely thick rights jurisprudence 
has allowed it to review executive proposals, whether passed by the legisla-
ture or promulgated using autonomous executive powers, quite aggressively. 
But our interest here is not in re-hashing the Court’s general activism and 
willingness to rethink executive policy decisions, which is a task others have 
undertaken132. Instead, we show how the ccc has linked its aggressive rights 
jurisprudence to the institutional context. 
The ccc uses weak legislative performance as a justification for judicial 
activism when considering executive-created proposals. One of the basic 
tools used by courts in comparative constitutional law is proportionality 
129 See T-025/04, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa § III.10.1 (noting that the Court is not “modifying the 
policy designed by the legislature”). 
130 See Rodrigo Uprimny & María Paula Saffon, Desplazamiento forzado y justicia transicional en 
Colombia, 8 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, 
How Far May Colombia’s Constitutional Court go to Protect IDP Rights, available at http://www.
fmreview.org/text/FMR/BrookingsSpecial/13.htm (last visited May 19, 2008). 
131 See Cepeda Espinosa, supra note 61. 
132 For an overview of the Court’s activism on rights questions, see, e. g., Cepeda, supra note 61.
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or balancing. Basically, this kind of tool measures the interests served by a 
piece of legislation against those constitutional rights and values infringed 
by it. One of the keys to any proportionality or balancing test is the level of 
deference with which the legislation is reviewed: how hard does the ccc look 
at the political branches’ assessment of the interests served by a particular 
piece of legislation? The question is particularly important in a country with 
a thick constitution, because virtually all pieces of legislation potentially 
place burdens on some constitutional rights. The ccc has stated its balanc-
ing test in an unusual way, with an eye on institutional considerations: “the 
measures must be proportional to the objectives pursued, to the care taken 
in the democratic debates, and to the sacrifices eventually imposed on [af-
fected groups]”. 133 In other words, if the legislature does its job of vetting a 
bill properly, the ccc will defer to the political branches. Where it does not, 
the ccc will exercise a more independent review of the executive’s proposal.
An important application of this principle occurred in a major executive-
led tax reform bill in 2003. The executive sought to broaden the base of the 
country’s value-added-tax, its biggest source of revenue, by getting rid of a 
bunch of traditionally exempted products. The fiscal crisis grew as the bill sat 
before Congress, and thus the president greatly expanded the bill by propos-
ing to tax a group of products that had historically not been taxed because 
they were “necessities.” The main challenge to the law rested on the argu-
ment that it unconstitutionally infringed the rights to life and to adequate 
sustenance, because it raised the price on necessary goods for people who 
could not afford the increase134. 
The ccc began by noting that, in principle, Congress was entitled to a 
“broad margin of configuration” in making tax decisions. The trouble here 
was the quality of debate on the provisions at issue, which would have ex-
panded the tax base to include many necessities traditionally exempted from 
the Vat. The ccc stressed that the provisions were not the object of even a 
“minimal public deliberation in the Congress in which [their] implication[s] 
for equity and progressiveness were explored.” The ccc emphasized that the 
Vat tax expansion was not in the original bill, but instead represented a last 
minute presidential addition, driven by a deteriorating fiscal situation during 
the year. And it found, reviewing the congressional record, that Congress 
had not engaged this part of the bill, and thus had never discussed the con-
sequences of the provision for middle class and poor groups, but instead had 
merely rubber-stamped the presidential proposal. Moreover, the bill itself 
showed an “indiscriminate” widening of the base to include many disparate 
items, thus offering evidence of a lack of deliberation.
133 C-038/04, Justice Eduardo Montealegre Lynett. 
134 See C-776/03, Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa.
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Given these facts, the ccc found that the legislature had not played its role 
properly and would not be given any “margin of configuration.” Instead the 
ccc independently reviewed, and struck down, the law in light of the con-
stitutional right to life, particularly given the context of declining welfare 
spending, high tax evasion by the rich, and the fact that most of the new 
spending would go to national defense and not welfare. This doctrinal line 
is a better way for the ccc to vindicate the interests it has identified in its line 
of jurisprudence on legislative procedure. Like in those cases, its concern is 
that the legislature often acts in an insufficiently “deliberative” manner and 
that “congressional autonomy” is often breached by presidential strong-arm 
tactics during the legislative process135. But the approach is less formalistic; 
the ccc is able to look more at the substance of debate, and not just at whether 
certain stages of debate occurred136. And its remedy, where it finds problems, 
is to take an independent look at executive policy, not to automatically strike 
down the bill on procedural grounds. Finally, the policy is flexible; on those 
(rare) occasions where Congress does a thorough job engaging a presidential 
bill, the ccc has exercised greater deference to the policy choice137. Thus, the 
ccc keeps open the Congress’s ability to develop a legislative constitutional-
ism and gives it ince.
135 C-776/03, Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa § 4.5.6; see also id. § 4.5.3.2.1 (“[D]eliberation makes 
effective the principle of political representation, by making know the position of the representa-
tives of the people, expressed in public reasons known, or at least identifiable, by everyone.”). 
136 In this sense, the Court’s work resembles American theorists who recommend taking a harder look 
at legislative deliberations to ensure that they are sufficiently rational and do not rest on prohibited 
grounds. See, e. g., Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, in 38, Stan. L. Rev., 29, 
69-73 (1985) (calling for a heightened rationality review that would look to see whether Congress 
actually considered a public justification for its project, and a more probing analysis of the congres-
sional record that would make sure laws did not actually rest on bias against disadvantaged groups).
137 A 2004 case involving deep reforms aimed at making the labor laws more flexible shows the flip side 
of the doctrine, on those rare occasions where the Court finds that the legislature has conducted itself 
well. Under the Court’s own prior case law, these steps (making firing easier, reducing pensions, al-
lowing pay reductions) were problematic, because they reduced the economic security of the middle 
and lower classes. Generally, under the Court’s “progressiveness” principle in the socio-economic 
area, the state cannot make poorer social groups worse off via policy change. See Rodrigo Uprimmy 
& Diana Guarnizo, ¿Es posible una dogmática adecuada sobre la prohibición de regresividad? Un 
enfoque desde la jurisprudencia constitucional colombiana, 7-11, 14 (unpublished manuscript, on file 
with author). Thus, the Court found that there was a prima facie case for unconstitutionality. But 
the Court found, unusually, that the legislature had “carefully studied and justified” the measures, 
and thus deferred to the legislative judgment. See C-038/04, Justice Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa.
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CONCLUSION: TOWARDS AN ANALySIS OF 
JUDICIAL ROLE “IN CONTEXT”
Unlike the United States, where popular constitutionalists argue that judi-
cial claims to supremacy in constitutional interpretation act as an obstacle 
to the development of constitutionalism by the Congress and by the people, 
in Colombia the ccc itself appears to do the best job of reflecting popular 
visions of constitutional transformation138. In contrast, the Colombian Con-
gress’s willingness and ability to carry out constitutional transformation is 
quite limited. 
This suggests that the concept of judicial independence in comparative 
constitutional politics and law may need to be reframed. Rather than look-
ing only at whether a court is insulated from other actors, we may be better 
served by focusing on exactly who the court views as its constituency and 
how these ties affect the functioning and legitimacy of the court. 
The goal here, at any rate, is not to give a definitive assessment of the ccc’s 
work; that task is well beyond the scope of this paper. The point instead is that 
the legitimacy of judicial review and constitutional jurisprudence deserves to be 
debated on its own institutional conditions. Building up a comparative theory 
of judicial role is not easy, and will not lead to clear answers, but it can help 
guide our assessments of constitutional design and the tasks of constitutional 
courts in developing countries.  
138 However, now there are factors that may constrain this possibility, such as an important increment 
of political pressure towards the conservatisation of judicial decisions, as well as the reintegration 
of the Court with conservative Justices. 
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